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The program, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’ 
(REDD), which operates within the international climate change policy framework, 
is projected to emerge as one of the key climate change mitigation mechanisms 
for developing countries. The existing Afforestation/Reforestation (A/R) mecha-
nism, operating under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, may prove useful 
for drawing lessons for the emerging REDD program, since both mechanisms repre-
sent flexible means for developed countries to achieve compliance with their 
mitigation targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The possible means include CDM as 
the basis for a project-based approach for the implementation of REDD (if adopt-
ed) or the inclusion of REDD within CDM. This article compares the features of A/R 
CDM and REDD, identifies similarities and differences, and analyses the extent to 
which the former can provide guidance for the development of a carbon govern-
ance mechanism for REDD.1  
Clean Development Mechanism: A background 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1994 (‘UNFCCC’) establishes the goal of 
‘stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system …’.2 In order to achieve this goal, the Kyoto Protocol 
to the UNFCCC (‘Kyoto Protocol’ or ‘Protocol’) sets binding, quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments (QELRCs) for developed countries (Annex I Parties under the UNFCCC) to limit or reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions.3 Three flexibility mechanisms have been established for this purpose: the Clean 
Development Mechanism, the Joint Implementation Mechanism and Emissions Trading. This article focuses 
on the first of these three mechanisms. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, provides 
Annex I Parties with a cost-effective mechanism to meet a percentage of their QELRCs under the Protocol 
by implementing an emission reduction project in developing countries (Non-Annex I Parties). Such projects 
can earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which 
can be counted towards meeting a part of the country’s QELRCs. All CDM projects are required to satisfy 
three requirements: (i) voluntary participation by the parties involved; (ii) real and measurable mitigation 
of emissions; and (iii) reductions that are additional to any that would have occurred in the absence of the 
project.4 CDM is also supposed to assist host (developing) countries in achieving sustainable development by 
transferring new low carbon technologies and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC.5 The 
different types of CDM projects relate to renewable energy, transport, supply-side and demand-side energy 
efficiency, and afforestation and deforestation etc. 
Articles 3(3) and 3(4) of UNFCCC establish the eligibility of different activities relating to the land-use, 
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector under the Kyoto Protocol. But the inclusion of these activities 
                                                        
1  See also Alain Karsenty, ‘The Architecture of Proposed REDD Schemes After Bali: Facing Critical Choices’ (2008) 10(3) 
International Forestry Review 443; Markus Lederer, ‘From CDM to REDD+ – What Do We Know for Setting Up Effective 
and Legitimate Carbon Governance?’ (2011) 70 Ecological Economics 1900. 
2  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992 (entered into force 21 
March 1994), art 2 (‘UNFCCC’). 
3  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 10 December 
1997 (entered into force 16 February 2005) (‘Kyoto Protocol’ or ‘protocol’). 
4  Ibid art 12(5). 
5  Ibid art 12(2). 
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was not straightforward. In fact, the eligibility of LULUCF projects under CDM was one of the most contro-
versial issues at the sixth session of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP-6) held at The Hague in 
November 2000. A compromise position was finally proposed: (1) designate avoided deforestation and com-
bating land degradation and desertification in Non-Annex I Parties as adaptation activities eligible for 
funding through the Adaptation Fund but not through the sale of carbon credits; (2) allow only afforestation 
and reforestation projects in CDM, with measures to address non-permanence, social and environmental 
effects, leakage, additionality and uncertainty.6 
The 2001 Marrakech Accords restricted the eligibility of LULUCF projects under CDM to afforestation and 
reforestation (A/R) projects during the first commitment period (2008-2012).7 For the purpose of CDM A/R 
activities, the terms ‘forest’, ‘afforestation’ and ‘reforestation’ are defined as follows:8 
‘Forest’ is a minimum area of land of 0.05-1.0 hectare with tree crown cover (or equivalent 
stocking level) of more than 10-30 per cent with trees with the potential to reach a minimum 
height of 2-5 metres at maturity in situ. A forest may consist either of closed forest formations 
where trees of various storeys and undergrowth cover a high proportion of the ground or open 
forest. Young natural stands and all plantations which have yet to reach a crown density of 10-30 
per cent or tree height of 2-5 metres are included under forest, as are areas normally forming 
part of the forest area which are temporarily unstocked as a result of human intervention such as 
harvesting or natural causes but which are expected to revert to forest. 
‘Afforestation’ is the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been forested for a 
period of at least 50 years to forested land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced 
promotion of natural seed sources. 
‘Reforestation’ is the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested land 
through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources, on land 
that was forested but that has been converted to non-forested land. For the first commitment 
period, reforestation activities will be limited to reforestation occurring on those lands that did 
not contain forest on 31 December 1989. 
A cap is also set on an industrialised country’s inclusion of CDM A/R CERs in its emissions accounting, that is 
one per cent of its base year emissions times five.9 
Other forestry activities such as deforestation and avoided degradation are excluded from the Kyoto Proto-
col (and CDM). This was partly due to the sovereignty concerns of developing countries who refused to 
consider forests as a global public good,10 and who did not want to cede their control over land use deci-
sions. The challenges and uncertainties inherent to quantifying forest sector emissions as well as 
methodological issues posed other major hurdles.11 
There are a limited number of A/R CDM projects compared to other CDM projects. Of the more than 1000 
CDM projects to date, only a few A/R project proposals have been submitted and approved/registered with 
the UNFCCC, including those listed in Table 1.12 
                                                        
6  UNFCCC, Decision 5/CP.6, The Bonn Agreements on the Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2001/5 dated 25 September 2001. 
7  UNFCCC, Decision 11/CP.1, Land Use, land-Use Change and Forestry, UN Doc FCCC/CP/ 2001/13/Add.1 dated 21 Janu-
ary 2002, Annex, paragraph 13. 
8  Ibid annex, para 1. 
9  Ibid annex, para 14. 
10 See Philip M Fearnside, ‘Saving Tropical Forests as a Global Warming Countermeasure: An Issue that Divides the Envi-
ronment Movement’ (2001) 39(2) Ecological Economics 167; William F Laurance, ‘A New Initiative to Use Carbon 
Trading for Tropical Forest Conservation’ (2007) 39(1) Biotropica 20; Stephanie Engel and Charles Palmer, ‘Painting the 
Forest REDD?  Prospects for Mitigating Climate Change through Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation’ 
(IED Working Paper 3, 2008) <http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv.php?pid=eth:41892&dsID=eth-41892-01.pdf>. 
11 Fearnside, above n 10; Laurance, above n 10. 
12 This table is based on Sebastian Thomas et al, ‘Why Are There So Few Afforestation and Reforestation Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism projects? (2010) 27 Land Use Policy 880; EuropeAid, ‘Afforestation Clean Development Project in 
Northern India – Haryana Community Forestry Project’ <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/case-
studies/india_forestry_haryana_en.pdf>; ‘Himachal Pradesh Becomes First Indian State to Sell Carbon Credits to the 
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Table 1: A/R project proposals submitted and approved/registered with the UNFCCC 
S. 




period Renewals  









2 Moldova Moldova Soil Con-
servation Project 
20 289 1 October 
2002 




3 India Cooperative A/f 
Haryana Project 
370 1 July 2008 20 2*20 Restoration of 
cropland 












6 Bolivia CETEFOR Project 247 
12 February 












The A/R CDM projects listed in Table 1 are on private or communal lands. They are usually developed by 
international NGOs or state agencies who can provide technical expertise for project design and implemen-
tation. Because of the large investment requirement, they are funded by non-profit NGOs, state agencies or 
private investors.13 
There are several reasons for the limited number of A/R CDM projects. These include the limited scope of 
such projects (restricted to A/R activities), high transaction costs due to complex rules and methodologies, 
registration costs, issues related to measurement and monitoring, and lack of transferability of the tempo-
rary credits assigned to projects etc.14 The calculation of real emissions removals presents a major problem 
due to issues concerning permanence, additionality and leakage; these three terms are briefly discussed 
below. 
A/R CDM projects create a new sink that grows and absorbs atmospheric carbon, but it will cease to absorb 
carbon at some point in time.15 The achieved sequestration may also be reversed, in which case the reduc-
tion of carbon in the atmosphere is nullified.16 In order to address the non-permanence issue, temporary 
credits or tCERs (which expire at the end of the commitment period) or long-term expiring credits or lCERS 
(which are valid for the crediting period) are issued for A/R projects. Their price value is only a fraction of 
the value of ‘permanent credits’ and they have to be renewed or replaced when they expire.17 Karsenty  
identifies several reasons for the reluctance of private operators to buy such credits, including the availa-
bility of a number of permanent credits at a moderate price on the CDM market.18 The decision of the 
European Union (EU) to exclude A/R CDM credits from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) also imposed 
a considerable constraint in market opportunities for mitigation activities from the forestry sector in devel-
oping countries.19 
                                                        
13 Thomas, above n 12. 
14 See Arild Angelsen et al, ‘What is the Right Scale for REDD? The Implications of National, Subnational and Nested 
Approaches’ (InfoBrief No. 15, Centre for International Forestry Research, 2008) 2; Thomas, above n 12. 
15 Margaret Skutsch and Eveline Trines, ‘Understanding Permanence in REDD’ (Policy Paper No 6, The Kyoto Think Global 
Act Local Project (K:TGAL), 2010) <http://www.communitycarbonforestry.org/NewPublications/KTGAL%20Policy% 
20Note%206%20Permanance%20in%20REDD.pdf>. See also Michael Dutschke and Arild Angelsen, ‘How Do We Ensure 
Permanence and Assign Liability?’ in Arild Angelsen (ed), Moving Ahead with REDD: Issues, Options and Implications 
(CIFOR, 2008); Margaret Skutsch and Ben de Jong, ‘The Permanence Debate’ (2010) 327 Science 107. 
16 Skutsch and Trines, above n 15. 
17 Karsenty, above n 1, 445. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Pham Manh Cuong, ‘REDD, LULUCF and CDM – Recent International Developments’ (2010) 
<http://www.iges.or.jp/en/fc/pdf/activity_201003/Vietnam/08_Cuong_REDD_Negotiation_processes.pdf>.  
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The additionality of an A/R CDM project can be assessed by comparing its activities with a reference sce-
nario20 consisting of the course of host country activities (which needs to be defined) that would occur 
without the project.21 Various authors have shown that a certain percentage of CDM projects are simply not 
additional.22 Decision 19/CP.9 defines leakage as the increase in greenhouse gas emissions by sources, 
which occurs outside the boundary of A/R CDM project activity, and which is measurable and attributable 
to the A/R project activity.23 Leakage is inevitable given the project-based approach adopted by CDM pro-
jects. These three concerns (impermanence, additionality and leakage) have seriously undermined the 
effectiveness of A/R CDM projects. 
REDD+ and CDM: The way forward? 
Like CDM, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) is a carbon mitigation mechanism 
within the UNFCCC framework. In recent years, the idea has evolved from REDD in the Bali Action Plan,24 to 
REDD Plus (or REDD+). REDD+ is REDD with conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks, and 
sustainable management of forests added. 
Given the purported success of CDM in meeting the carbon mitigation commitments of developed countries 
through activities undertaken in developing countries, comparisons between CDM and REDD+ were inevita-
ble. It is argued that CDM experiences can facilitate the future development of REDD+. The inclusion of 
REDD+ in the CDM framework has also been proposed. For example, a report of the High-Level Panel on the 
CDM Policy Dialogue (September 2012) highlights the potential benefits of including REDD+ activities in CDM 
as follows: 
[P]romoting sustainable development; shifting the distribution of CERs towards a more equitable 
balance among countries (as several forested developing countries do not have many opportuni-
ties in other sectors); creating further options for generating cost-effective reductions; and 
facilitating learning-by-doing for how to include REDD+ in carbon markets’.25 
According to the report, the inclusion of REDD+ in the CDM could also ‘create a stable, low-cost source of 
future CERs’.26 Although the report does not dismiss the potential risks of including REDD+ activities in 
CDM,27 most of which have been discussed above, it suggests ‘careful design’ as the method to mitigate 
many of these risks.28 According to the report, the inclusion of ‘limited project-based REDD+ and/or larger-
scale (sub-national or national) pilot activities into the CDM’ can ‘create important learning-by-doing op-
portunities for the international community in anticipation of future REDD+ mechanisms, which may 
accelerate their development’.29 It further states that the inclusion of REDD+ in CDM ‘would also help di-
rect CDM projects and programmes toward nations that might not otherwise participate in the sustainable 
development benefits of the CDM and might not otherwise gain experience with carbon markets’.30 The 
report then suggests that ‘[I]nstead of taking up all activities within the scope of REDD+, development of 
those activities already covered by the CDM in afforestation and reforestation should be pursued further’.31 
On the other hand, concerns have also been raised about the trend drawing parallels between CDM and 
REDD+. Table 2 shows the differences between these two carbon mitigation mechanisms. 
                                                        
20 The reference scenario is a counterfactual hypothesis representing the ‘best guess’ regarding the future course of 
events. See Karsenty, above n 1, 444. 
21 Ibid. 
22 See, for eg, Alex Michaelowa and Pallav Purohit, ‘Additionality Determination of Indian Projects: Can Indian CDM 
Project Developers Outwit the CDM Executive Board?’ (2007) <http://medias.lemonde.fr/mmpub/edt/doc/20070608/ 
920594_additionality_determination_of_indian_cdm_projects.pdf>.  
23 UNFCCC, Decision 19/CP 9, Modalities and Procedures for Afforestation and Reforestation Project Activities Under the 
Clean Development Mechanism, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add 2 dated 30 March 2004, annex. 
24 The Bali Action Plan called for ‘policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of 
forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries’, see UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties 
Thirteenth Session, Dec. 3–15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, ¶ 1, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 1/1/CP.13 dated 14 March 2008, para 1(b)(iii) (‘Bali Action Plan’). 
25 CDM Policy Dialogue, ‘Climate Change, Carbon Markets and the CDM: A Call to Action’ (Report of the High-Level Panel 
on the CDM Policy Dialogue, September 2012) 28-29 <http://www.cdmpolicydialogue.org/report/rpt110912.pdf>. 
26 Ibid 29-30. 
27 Ibid 28-29. 
28 Ibid 29-30. 
29 Ibid 28. 
30 Ibid 29. 
31 Ibid 30. 
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Table 2: Difference between CDM and REDD+ 
 CDM REDD+ 
Activities • Reducing emissions from afforestation 
• Reducing emissions from reforestation 
• Reducing emissions from deforestation  
• Reducing emissions from forest degradation  
• Conservation of forest carbon stocks 
• Sustainable management of forests  
• Enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
Coverage 
Uneven distribution in favor of emerging 
economies (China, India, Brazil); bypasses 
least developed countries (for example, in 
Africa) 
Focus on least developed countries in the tropics 
(for example, Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Laos) 
Scale Project-based  National, sub-national or hybrid 
Compliance & 
Liability Low host country involvement Higher host country involvement 
Some of the issues confronting A/R CDM projects and REDD+ activities appear to be similar, for example 
permanence, additionality and leakage, and it may be argued that they can be resolved in a similar man-
ner. Critics will, of course, point to the fact that some aspects of these issues have not been (and cannot 
be) fully resolved. Further, a number of other outstanding issues need to be discussed before determining 
the extent to which A/R CDM projects can provide the basis for operationalising REDD+. This section high-
lights some of these issues. 
Definitional concerns  
The term ‘forest’ needs to be defined for the purpose of REDD+ given the fundamental difference between 
the scope of forestry activities under CDM and REDD+. The other terms that require definition include ‘sus-
tainable management of forests’ and ‘enhancement of carbon stocks’, which form the building blocks of 
any REDD+ framework.32 Given the differences in the nature of forests in different countries, these defini-
tions are more likely to evolve at the national level rather than at the international level, as was the case 
for CDM. Further, the interactions between REDD+ activities and the drivers of deforestation such as agri-
cultural expansion, wood extraction and infrastructure extension must be taken into account. 
Scalar issues33 
There is considerable difference of opinion about the right scale for REDD+ activities. The three commonly 
discussed possibilities are: 
(i) At the national level, where direct support is given to national governments of developing coun-
tries and the whole forest area of the host countries is covered.  
a. Advantages: allows pursuit of a broad set of policies, addresses domestic leakage, and creates 
country ownership. 
b. Challenges: only feasible for a few countries (in short- to medium-term), does not work well in 
situations susceptible to governance failures, and less likely to mobilise private sector invest-
ment and local government involvement. 
(ii) A subnational/project approach, where international/external financing is based on individual 
projects. This is similar to CDM.  
a. Advantages: early involvement, wide participation and attractive to private investors. 
b. Challenges: leakages, failure to address broader forces driving deforestation and forest degra-
dation. 
(iii) A hybrid/nested approach.34 
a. Advantages: most flexible mechanism. 
b. Challenges: harmonisation. 
The limited success of A/R projects suggests that a project-based REDD approach cannot simply replicate 
the CDM model.35 As argued by Skutsch and Trines, while it may be possible to use the project-based REDD 
                                                        
32 See, eg, Nophea Sasaki and Francis E Putz, ‘Do Definitions of Forest and Forest Degradation Matter in the REDD Agree-
ment?’ (Working Paper, 5 December 2008) <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1306431>. 
33 This section draws on Angelsen, above n 14. 
34 See also Lucio Pedroni et al, ‘Creating incentives for avoiding further deforestation: the nested approach’ (2009) 9(2) 
Climate Policy 207. 
REDD+ and the clean development mechanism: a comparative perspective 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
International Journal of Rural Law and Policy  2013 Special Edition 
REDD+ and the legal regime of mangroves, peatlands and other wetlands: ASEAN and the world 
6 
model for pilot purposes in the interim, it is unlikely to survive when national REDD programmes get fully 
operational because most governments prefer to keep the REDD programme in their own hands rather than 
allowing projects to be individually funded and from outside.36 
Leakage 
Leakage refers to the shifting of deforestation from the site where REDD+ activities are being undertaken to 
another location.37 According to Madeira, this may take place directly, where deforestation agents shift 
their equipment and labour to a nearby patch of forest, or indirectly where the market price of timber, 
livestock and crops increases as a result of REDD activities.38 She recommends the buffer approach to mini-
mise leakage where ‘leakage can be accounted for by requiring that a percentage of a project’s REDD 
credits be held in reserve and not be sold. In this manner, the reserve account would offset or neutralise 
the leakage that was assumed to have taken place.’39 
Additionality  
It is more difficult to assess additionality (that is, what would have occurred in terms of deforestation 
without REDD+) at the national level than at the project level (as in the case of A/R CDM projects) because 
of the co-existence of a much larger number of variables, including the man-made and natural causes of 
deforestation.40 Ongoing pilot/demonstration REDD activities have also been criticised for their failure to 
satisfy the additionality criterion. For example, it has been argued that the Meghalaya REDD pilot project 
does not meet the additionality requirement because the local communities were undertaking carbon miti-
gation activities anyway although they were not known by this name.41 The additionality requirement may 
also deprive countries that have already taken actions to prevent deforestation from REDD+ incentives. It 
has been argued that countries with low rates of deforestation should be rewarded (outside the REDD+ 
mechanism) to avoid creating perverse incentive for these countries to increase deforestation in order to 
then qualify for REDD incentives.42 
Baselines 
In order to assess the effectiveness of a REDD+ activity and the allocation of emissions reduction credits, it 
is necessary to determine the ‘baseline’ or ‘a level of emissions that would occur in the absence of a forest 
carbon policy and is used as a reference case for quantifying mitigation performance’.43 Different methods 
are available in order to determine the baseline including the ‘national circumstances’ approach and calcu-
lating historical (national/global) deforestation rates based on existing remote sensing imagery. However, 
many regions and countries argue that historic rates do not indicate the current risk of deforestation. One 
example is countries that have a low rate of deforestation because they are experiencing political instabil-
ity, which limits access to forests and markets. But an improvement in the political situation may result in 
an increase in deforestation, in which case historic baseline underestimates the real pressure on the for-
ests.44 
Permanence  
It is hard to ensure the permanence of any carbon storage/emission reductions achieved as a result of 
REDD+ activities.45 Impermanence refers to their potential reversibility due to the vulnerability of forests to 
                                                                                                                                                                       
35 Angelsen, above n 14, 3. 
36 Skutsch and Trines, above n 15.  
37 See Sven Wunder, ‘How do we deal with leakage’ in Arild Angelsen (ed), Moving Ahead with REDD: Issues, Options and 
Implications (CIFOR, 2008) 65-75.  
38 See Erin C Myers Madeira, ‘Policies to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in Developing 
Countries – An examination of the issues facing the incorporation of REDD into market-based climate policies’ (Re-
sources for the Future, 2008) 11. 
39 Ibid 10-11. 
40 Karsenty, above n 1, 445. 
41 Chris Lang, ‘India’s First REDD Project in the East Khasi Hills: “When You Say That I Need Permission to Cut My Own 
Tree, I Have Lost My Right to My Land!”’ (29 November 2011) <http://www.redd-monitor.org/2011/11/29/indias-first-
redd-project-in-the-east-khasi-hills-when-you-say-that-i-need-permission-to-cut-my-own-tree-i-have-lost-my-right-to-
my-land/>. 
42 Erin C Myers, ‘Climate Change and Forestry: A REDD Primer’ (2011) <http://www.katoombagroup.org/documents/cds/ 
uganda_2011/REDD/Climate%20Change%20and%20Forestry_%20A%20REDD%20Primer.pdf>. 
43 Lydia P Olander et al, ‘International Forest Carbon and the Climate Change Challenge: Issues and Options’ (Nicholas 
Institute Policy Brief, Duke University, 2009) 32. 
44 Myers, above n 42. 
45 Dutschke and Angelsen, above n 15; Bernhard Schlamadinger and Penny Baalman, ‘Scaling Up AFOLU Mitigation Activi-
ties in Non-Annex I Countries’ (Report Commissioned for the Eliasch Review, Climate Strategies, 2008). 
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natural and anthropogenic disturbances.46 The non-permanence issue in REDD+ can be resolved by discount-
ing the carbon stored in trees, thereby taking into account that some of it might be lost;47 or putting some 
carbon profits into an insurance fund to compensate for non-permanence.48 The scale at which REDD+ activ-
ities are implemented also influences the risk of non-permanence. For example, there is no requirement to 
maintain forest carbon in any one specific location as one moves from project-scale to sectoral-scale activi-
ties, and increases in deforestation in one place can be offset with reducing deforestation at another 
location.49 
Use of market-based instruments 
REDD+ activities in developing countries would at least partially be eligible for offsets in developed coun-
tries. Proponents of market-based instruments argue that markets provide incentives and generate enough 
resources to actually stop deforestation. But there is great opposition to the use of market-based instru-
ments in the context of REDD+ compared with CDM. According to the opponents, however, if REDD+ credits 
were fungible and could be traded, the amount of supply generated would eventually flood the regulatory 
market with cheap credits.50 This would deflate CER prices, endanger the credibility of the CDM market and 
remove the incentives for developed countries to generate domestic reduction credits,51 or develop low-
carbon technologies such as carbon capture and storage. According to Lederer (2011), however, this seems 
exaggerated because the generation of such credits is subject to the implementation of REDD+ projects by 
developing countries, which will first require considerable capacity development.52 As a result, at present, 
the credits generated from REDD activities can only be traded on voluntary markets, such as the Chicago 
Climate Exchange, or paid for using designated carbon funds, such as the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Part-
nership Facility (FCPF). 
Rights of indigenous communities 
REDD+ exerts stronger influence on local governance issues than CDM. Unlike A/R CDM projects, which are 
mostly developed on private lands, the focus of REDD+ is government-owned forests in developing countries 
where security of tenure and unclear and contested land ownership rights is a major issue. As a result, 
REDD+ activities have a far greater potential to harm local communities and indigenous groups if not im-
plemented with appropriate safeguards.53 The implementation of REDD+ activities is dependent upon 
answers to questions such as: Who owns forest carbon? Who gets compensated? How much each stakeholder 
should receive? Will the benefits reach the communities bearing the burden of forest stewardship? How will 
the priorities of forest-dependent communities and indigenous peoples be satisfied? The answers to these 
questions are difficult in the absence of clear and legally defined ownership structures. 
The conflict can be illustrated by considering the situation in India where the Government of India has 
enacted the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 
2006 to recognise the rights of these historically marginalised forest-dependent communities. At the same 
time, the government has actively endorsed and is promoting REDD+ as a carbon mitigation mechanism. 
This is a very contentious issue and there is widespread concern that the interests of forest-dependent 
communities may be subsumed in order to grab land to accommodate the large private players who would 
be interested in REDD+ activities once they are successfully operationalised.  
Further, unlike CDM, REDD+ requires much more input-oriented legitimacy given that the participation of 
indigenous peoples and local communities is imperative in several cases. This, in turn, may lead to stronger 
trade-offs with effectiveness of REDD+ as co-benefits, namely poverty alleviation, carbon mitigation and 
stemming biodiversity loss may not materialize easily.54 REDD+ also has to address issues relating to forestry 
sector governance. These include built-in perverse incentives for corruption in emissions offsets programs 
                                                        
46 Madeira, above n 38, 12. 
47 Ian Fry, ‘Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation: opportunities and pitfalls in developing a new 
legal regime’ (2008) 17 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 166. 
48 Charlotte Streck, ‘Financing REDD: A Review of Selected Policy Proposals’ (Climate Focus, 2009). 
49 Myers, above n 42. 
50 Paul Leach, ‘Carbon Sunk? The Potential Impacts of Avoided Deforestation Credits on Emissions Trading Mechanisms’ 
(Rainforest Foundation UK, 2008). 
51 K Karaousakis, ‘Incentives to Reduce GHG Emissions from Deforestation: Lessons Learned from Costa Rica and Mexico’ 
(OECD, 2007). 
52 Lederer, above n 1, 1902. 
53 See, eg, Tom Griffiths, ‘Seeing ‘REDD’?: Forests, climate change mitigation and the rights of indigenous peoples and 
local communities’ (Forest Peoples Programme, 2008). 
54 Lederer, above n 1, 1905. 
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setting baseline levels, reconciling project and national credits in nested model, and long-term monitoring 
and enforcement.55  
Validation procedure/criteria and sustainable development 
Similar to CDM, countries may be required to develop procedures and criteria for validating REDD+ projects. 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol stipulates that CDM projects must contribute to sustainable development in 
host countries. Host countries are responsible for defining sustainable development criteria and ensuring 
that projects adhere to these criteria as a condition for CDM project registration. Therefore, countries have 
to define a procedure for project approval. Most countries developed simple checklists often consisting of 
social, environmental and economic benefits. The lack of a common standard or benchmark for sustainable 
development criteria has led to an inadequate consideration of sustainable development in CDM projects.56 
The legitimacy of REDD+ activities will depend considerably on the ability of national governments to de-
termine validation procedures/criteria. 
Conclusion 
Forests form the core of A/R CDM projects and REDD+ activities, and some of the issues incorporated by the 
two frameworks are common, such as leakage, additionality, permanence and baselines. However, the 
potentially multi-scalar nature of REDD+ activities is likely to raise a number of additional issues. The lim-
ited scope of A/R CDM projects precluded concerns relating to governance of forests in developing 
countries but forest governance reform is critical for the success of REDD+ activities. Further, protection of 
rights of indigenous communities and sustainability of forest use must form an integral part of REDD+ activi-
ties unlike A/R CDM projects, which have largely failed to fulfil their goals of promoting sustainable 
development in developing countries while generating CER credits for developed countries. 
The lessons learnt from operationalising A/R CDM projects – for example the reasons for the limited mar-
ketability of credits generated – are useful to keep in mind when considering the appropriate financial 
mechanism for REDD+ activities, but the existing CDM framework cannot form the basis for REDD+ activities 
in the future. Nor is it possible to automatically include REDD+ activities in the CDM framework. It is also 
important to remember that while consensus has been generated in some quarters regarding the potential 
of REDD+, the resolution of a number of outstanding issues is a pre-requisite before the implementation of 
REDD+ activities as a part of the international climate change mitigation framework.  
                                                        
55 Michael L Brown, ‘Limiting Corrupt Incentives in a Global REDD Regime’ (2010) 37 Ecology Law Quarterly 237. 
56 Peter A Minang and Deborah Murphy, ‘REDD after Copenhagen: The way forward’ (ASB IISD, 2010) 
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2010/redd_after_copenhagen.pdf>. 
